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A B S T R A C T
In this paper we use a non-linear programming approach to predict the wider interregional and interindustry
impacts of natural gas ﬂow disruptions. In the short run, economic actors attempt to continue their business-as-
usual and follow established trade patters as closely as possible. In the model this is modelled by minimizing the
information gain between the original pattern of economic transactions and the situation in which natural gas
ﬂows are disrupted. We analyze four scenarios that simulate Russian export stops of natural gas by means of a
model calibrated on an international input-output table with six sectors and six regions.
The simulations show that at the lower levels of aggregation considerable eﬀects are found. At the aggregate
level of the whole economy, however, the impacts of the four scenarios are negligible for Europe and only a little
less so for Russia itself. Interestingly, the eﬀects on the size of the economy, as measured by its GDP, are
predominantly positive for the various European regions, but negative for Russia. The eﬀects on the welfare of
the populations involved, however, as measured by the size of domestic ﬁnal demand, have an opposite sign;
with predominantly negligible but negative eﬀects for European regions, and very small positive eﬀects for the
Russian population.
1. Introduction
In aiming to ensure a resilient energy system, the European Union
(EU) initiated an extensive energy policy package (European
Commission, 2015). Natural gas is given an important role in meeting
future EU-wide energy demand. It can be ﬂexibly produced and stored,
and therefore represents a good backup for intermittent renewable
energy. Signiﬁcant natural gas demand growth and demand variability
is foreseen, especially for certain regions (Smith, 2013). Due to
dwindling EU natural gas reserves, dependency on non-EU gas ﬂows
will increase. Anticipating these developments, multiple far-reaching
measures have been taken in order to arrive at a single well-functioning
internal gas market. The continuing integration of the gas market also
contributes to larger gas ﬂows across all EU countries.
Russia is one of the main suppliers of natural gas to the EU-market
(International Energy Agency, 2014). Russia exports its natural gas to
Europe via pipelines, which requires crossing the territory of third
countries, like Ukraine. Over the years, problems between Russia and
Ukraine have had their impact on natural gas ﬂows to the EU. The 19-
day complete disruption of transit ﬂows via Ukraine at the start of 2009
has been the worst incident so far (see Pirani et al. (2009) for details).
It impacted consumers in several East European countries, mainly
through problems with district heating, but the alleged impact on
industrial output could not be separated from other possible causes of
change (Kovacevic, 2009). On January 20th of that year, supply was
reinstated after signing a 10-year transit contract; the current transit
contract between Gazprom, Russia's main natural gas producer and
monopolist of pipeline exports, and Naftogaz, owner of the pipelines in
Ukraine. This contract will thus end in 2019. Although both the
European Union and Russia have been working on diversifying the
transit routes, the reliance on Ukrainian transit capacity will still be
sizeable in 2019, which may again lead to problems (Pirani and
Yaﬁmava, 2016).
On the other hand, Russia is also actively pursuing strategies to
diversify away from Europe and to generate gas export revenues
elsewhere (Dickel et al., 2014; Shadrina, 2014). The focus is currently
on developing gas ﬁelds in East Siberia for East Asian markets. Over
the past years demand from this region has increased, resulting
primarily in the development of LNG investment projects
(Motomura, 2014). Even though the recently agreed contract with
China includes building a pipeline called the ‘Power of Siberia’, that is
currently being constructed, it is not expected to be operational before
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2020 (International Energy Agency, 2014).1 In addition, this pipeline
will not directly compete with exports to Europe, as it is built east of
Mongolia and does not connect to the European network.
The pipeline that would allow Russia to alternate gas ﬂows between
Europe and China, to be build west of Mongolia through the Altai
Republic, however, only represents a sketchy plan (Dickel et al., 2014).
Russia's advancements over the years have been very haphazard for
several reasons, among which the global economic crisis, technical
diﬃculties in developing these East Siberian ﬁelds, and lengthy
negotiation processes (Fernández and Palazuelos, 2011; Henderson
and Stern, 2014). Still, with subsequent energy strategies, Russia has
become more positive about the share of gas that will be exported to
East Asia, reaching over 30% by 2035 (Shadrina, 2014). Paltsev (2014)
has conﬁrmed the feasibility of this scenario using a modelling
approach. Impacts on the European market, in terms of diversion of
ﬂows elsewhere, however, are likely to be limited, although Russia may
be able to take a stronger bargaining position after 2050 (Orlov, 2016).
The renewed Ukraine-Russia turmoil over the past years has again
increased the tension between the EU and Russia. Alternative routes,
via Belarus (Yamal pipeline) or via the Baltic Sea (Nord Stream
pipeline) oﬀer spare capacity, but not enough to fully replace transit
ﬂows through Ukraine (Pirani and Yaﬁmava, 2016). The European
Commission has published a reinforced energy security strategy,
focusing on more resolute actions to diversify supply and strengthen
the internal infrastructure in order to promote resilience to disruptions
(European Commission, 2014a). This strategy is a response to mitigate
the EU's dependence on Russia as natural gas supplier and on Ukraine
as main transit country. To assess EU's vulnerability to Russian gas
supplies, the European Commission has, furthermore, undertaken a
stress test to see whether the EU would be able to get through a winter
without any imports from Russia. The sources expected to contribute
most to the alternative supply of natural gas are Norway, LNG, and
underground storage facilities in the EU. Only in case all Member
States cooperate, no household would have to be aﬀected. The Eastern
Member States and former Yugoslavian countries would be aﬀected
most (European Commission, 2014b).
Ex-post modelling of the 2009 Ukraine incident showed that, given
the available infrastructure and storage, the European gas industry
dealt with the crisis in nearly the best possible way (Lochner, 2011).
The mild winter and the economic crisis had caused storage levels to be
higher than usual, which mitigated the impact of the crisis. Still, a small
increase in the ﬂexibility of pipelines, i.e., making reverse ﬂows
possible, would have signiﬁcantly improved the security of supply in
Eastern Europe. Richter and Holz (2015) show that the average impact
on the EU would be limited to slightly higher prices, at least in their
short term disruption scenarios. Again, certain East European coun-
tries are much more severely aﬀected. The long term disruption
scenario has much more impact. The authors see an important role
for LNG, although large investments in transportation infrastructure
would be needed to accommodate these ﬂows. Egging and Holz (2016)
investigate a scenario in which transit of Russian gas via Ukraine is
disrupted from 2020. Again, the role of LNG is conﬁrmed, and the
authors remark that Poland has started to become a transit hub.
Interestingly, Egging and Holz (2016) also claim that China will be
dominating the global natural gas market in the future in all their
scenarios, even despite the possibility of signiﬁcant climate policy
eﬀorts that may be undertaken (Holz et al., 2015).
The strong international dimension of the gas market implies that
any supply shock will be propagated extensively through the network.
Not only in terms of the physical ﬂows of natural gas, but also in terms
of the economic impact of gas ﬂow disruptions. In this paper, we
investigate the wider economic impacts of disruptions in the supply of
natural gas with a new approach. A non-linear programming model is
used to predict the short and medium term interregional and inter-
industry impacts of four disruption scenarios. In the model, these
impacts are determined by the hypothesized attempts of economic
actors to continue their business-as-usual, as much as possible, by
staying as close as possible to their established trade patterns. This
behavioral response to a disruption is implemented by minimizing the
diﬀerence between the pre- and the post-disruption pattern of eco-
nomic transactions.
Several scenarios will be analyzed based on data from the EXIOPOL
international input-output database (see Tukker et al. (2013)), because
this database includes a separate natural gas extraction sector. The set
of scenarios we study focuses on the fact that Russia may decide to stop
the export of natural gas. This could be a total ban on all exports to the
EU, in its most extreme form. More realistically, it may be a setting in
which only particular cross-border ﬂows are hampered. For example,
physical pipelines may be damaged, or Russia may decide to limit
cross-border ﬂows to certain European regions for political reasons.
These situations will be simulated by reducing or removing the
economic transactions related to the ﬂows of natural gas between
countries. Limited changes in gas supply can be accommodated by the
gas infrastructure of the EU, because of redundant capacity for security
of supply reasons. However, due to limited transport capacity, or
limited possibilities to extract additional gas, natural gas quantities
that can be supplied in the short and medium run will be limited.
Our type of analysis of the economic impacts of natural gas ﬂow
disruptions will inform policy makers on the order of magnitude of the
wider economic impacts from disruptions in the supply of natural gas.
The results also identify critical gas supplier relations for the economic
functioning of the Member States and strains on the rest of the
economic system following a gas supply disruption. Our type of
approach could also be used to further investigate mitigation strategies,
such as diversifying supply or investing in additional infrastructure.
2. Modelling methodology, data and scenarios
The model used mimics that, in the short run, economic actors
attempt to continue their business-as-usual, and attempt to follow
established trade patters as closely as possible. This behavior is
simulated by minimizing the information gain between the original
pattern of economic transactions between all industries and all regions
distinguished, as shown in the base year interregional input-output
table (IRIOT) at hand, and the situation in which the ﬂow of natural
gas is disrupted, as captured by the measure originally proposed by
Kullback (1959) and Theil (1967). Here, we use a slightly adapted
version of the information measure that is referred to as IGRAS (Huang
et al., 2008). Our type of model was ﬁrst set-up to analyze the impact of
natural disasters (Oosterhaven and Bouwmeester, 2016, see also Koks
and Thissen, 2016), but it is also suited to simulate the impacts of trade
boycotts. See Oosterhaven (2017) for the reasons of choosing this
modelling approach above, e.g., the standard extended input-output
(IO) model, the inoperability IO model or the hypothetical extraction
method.
Our modelling approach focuses on all economic relations for the
entire economies of the regions included, which allows us to analyze
the impact of the disruption scenarios for the entire economy. Other
models used in the literature for disruption analysis concentrate on the
natural gas production sector and/or the natural gas transport infra-
structure. The TIGER model, used by Lochner et al. (2010) and
Lochner (2011), is a linear optimization network ﬂow model that
minimizes the cost of natural gas demand satisfaction, constrained by
the available capacities of over a thousand infrastructure elements. The
Global Gas Model is a partial equilibrium model set up as a large-scale
mixed complementarity problem, with high detail on storage and
transportation infrastructure (Richter and Holz, 2015); a stochastic
variant also exists (Egging and Holz, 2016). The model solves for long-
1 See also: http://neftegaz.ru/en/news/view/154118-Gazprom-s-Power-of-Siberia-
pipeline-set-for−2020-launch.
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term cost-eﬃcient equilibria. Focusing on the infrastructure,
GEMFLOW is a model representing an interconnected regional gas
system that gives an overview at the country level of the reaction to a
disruption event by the user. The model applies a Monte Carlo
approach to identify the scenarios with the longest operability of the
system or with the smallest loss in natural gas consumption (Szikszai
and Monforti, 2011). Due to our focus on an economy-wide approach,
our model does not include capacity limits of the current physical
transport infrastructure. Still, by remaining as close as possible to the
current economic ﬂows, which have been realized with the current
infrastructure, we believe we can realistically sketch the economy-wide
impacts.
2.1. Base model
The objective function of the model minimizes the information loss
of the disrupted IRIOT compared to the base year IRIOT:
Minimize z z z y y y
v v v
∑ [ln( / ) − 1] + ∑ [ln( / ) − 1]+
+ ∑ [ln( / ) − 1 ],

























where the variables are: z=intermediate demand, y=ﬁnal demand,
excluding changes in inventories and valuables, and v=value added at
market prices (GDP). Excluding changes in inventories implies that our
model does not include the ultra-short term mitigating eﬀects of using
natural gas from storage sites. Instead we focus on the short to medium
term (say multiple months) impacts of disruptions in the cross-border
ﬂows of natural gas. The indices i and j indicate industries of origin and
destination, and r and s regions of origin and destination, respectively.
A · represents the summation over an index, and ex stands for
exogenous, i.e., for the actual values from the base year IRIOT.
The objective function (1) is minimized subject to a number of
constraints. First, all economic transactions are restricted to have
either a zero or a positive value, i.e., all variables in (1) are to take semi-
positive values only (see Oosterhaven and Bouwmeester, 2016, for a
further discussion).
Second, we assume cost minimization under a Walras-Leontief
production function, per input, per industry, per region, which results
in (Oosterhaven, 1996):
∑ z a x v c x i j s= and = , ∀ , ,r ijrs ijs js js js js∙ (2)
Where additionally x=total output, a=intermediate inputs per unit of
output, and c=value added per unit of output, where a and c are
calculated from the base year IRIOT as a z x= ∑ /ijs r ij
rs ex
j
s ex∙ , , and
c v x= /js js ex js ex, , , with a c∑ + = 1i ij
s
j
s∙ . Note that (2) excludes the possi-
bility of technical substitution, e.g., of coal for natural gas, but does
allow for spatial substitution, e.g., of natural gas from one origin region
for that from another origin region.
Thirdly, we assume that prices, which in our approach do not need
to be modelled explicitly, do change is such a way that all markets are
in short run equilibrium, i.e., that demand equals supply, per industry,
per region:
∑ ∑z y x i r+ = , ∀ , .s j ijrs s irs ir, ∙ (3)
Not needing to model prices explicitly, is a great simplifying
advantage of our approach. Note that (2) and (3) combined ascertain
that total input equals total output, per industry, per region, which
implies that any solution of (1)–(3) satisﬁes the IRIOT accounting
identities.
In the speciﬁc case studied here, i.e., that of natural resource
extraction, the production of additional output is restricted by existing
reserves. Our last restriction, therefore, speciﬁes our estimate of the
natural gas production restrictions by region.
x x i r≤ , ∀ , .ir ir, max (4)
The above non-linear programming approach (1)–(4), thus com-
bines the assumption of ﬁxed technical coeﬃcients with ﬂexible trade
coeﬃcients. This implies that (partial) import and export substitution
(cf. Oosterhaven, 1988) is considered to represent a realistic reaction to
supply shocks to the ﬂows of natural gas.
2.2. Data
The input-output database used has been constructed during the
EXIOPOL project (Tukker et al., 2013).2 The full database contains 43
countries and 129 sectors. For this ﬁrst empirical application of this
new model, we have aggregated the data to six sectors and six regions.
The sectors and regions represented are given in Table 1. In Appendix
A the concordances with the original data are given. The diﬀerent
categories of value added per sector have been combined with the data
on taxes less subsidies per sector, resulting in one value (gross value
added measured at market prices) that represents each sector's
contribution to GDP. In the remainder of this paper, we refer to this
single value simply as “value added”.
The focus of our study is on the European Union. Its countries have
been divided into four regions primarily based on their geographical
location and the layout of the main natural gas pipelines, and
secondarily based on their position in the gas market. Of all non-EU
countries, we have kept the Russian Federation as a separate region,
due to its important role in the supply of gas to the European market.
All countries outside the European Union and Russia have been
combined into one large region called ‘Rest of the World’. The grouping
of countries is visually represented in Fig. 1.
With respect to the sectors, we have kept two single sectors from the
extensive set of sectors represented in the full EXIOPOL database.
These are the natural gas extraction sector and that part of the
electricity sector that is fueled by natural gas. The natural gas
extraction sector will allow us to look at the speciﬁc eﬀects of changes
in the supply of natural gas. The electricity from gas sector is fully
dependent on the supply of natural gas and is directly harmed by a
reduction in the supply of natural gas. The third small sector, other
energy extraction, is an aggregation of all other individual energy
extraction sectors that are present in the EXIOPOL database. This
sector may function as a substitute for natural gas extraction in an
indirect sense. Given the Leontief technology assumption in Eq. (2),
natural gas inputs cannot be directly substituted. However, sectors in
diﬀerent countries may rely on diﬀerent energy sources. Consequently,
the output of such a sector may be substituted for the output of a sector
that relies on natural gas, which represents an indirect type of
substitution. This potential coping mechanism is not considered in
the other models used in the literature. The remaining sectors are
aggregated into a primary sector representing agriculture, forestry and
ﬁshing, a secondary sector representing manufacturing, and a tertiary
sector representing services.
Europe's capacity to produce additional natural gas domestically is
Table 1
Regions and sectors represented in the model.
Regions Sectors
North-West Europe Primary
South-West Europe Natural gas extraction
East Europe Other energy extraction
North-East Europe Secondary
Russian Federation Electricity from gas
Rest of the World Tertiary
2 The data are publicly available via the website exiobase.eu. For this study EXIOBASE
1 (year 2000) was used, as the follow-up IRIOT was not available at the time this analysis
was undertaken.
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severely limited due to limited reserves. To include this in the model,
all scenarios are implemented with constraints on additional produc-
tion, as indicated in Eq. (4). The percentages for North-West Europe
and for the Rest of the World have been derived from European
Commission (2014b). The percentages for the other regions are set in
relation to their current production capacity and represent general
estimates of what could additionally be produced given the present
reserves. The output constraints used in our model are listed in
Table 2.3 In the future, these production capacities may increase due
to the production of unconventional gas, which would also impact
international gas ﬂows. Osička et al. (2016), for example, describe how
the production of unconventional gas in Poland would signiﬁcantly
impact regional natural gas ﬂow patterns if it would become a success.
2.3. Scenarios
To study the economic impacts of disruptions in the ﬂows of natural
gas, we have deﬁned four scenarios. All scenarios focus on Russia due
to its role as single most important supplier of natural gas to the EU
economy. In the ﬁrst scenario Russian exports to all European
countries are stopped, in the second only its exports to North-East
Europe, in the third only its exports to East Europe, and in the fourth
only its exports to North-West and South-West Europe. The ﬁrst
scenario thus constitutes the combination of the latter three. Each
scenario is formed by adding the following Scenario-speciﬁc equation
to the Base scenario (1)–(4):







The diﬀerent scenarios are shown in Table 3. A list of the speciﬁc
countries belonging to the diﬀerent regions can be found in Appendix
A.
Although natural gas exports are not as important for the Russian
economy as oil exports, fully cutting oﬀ the entire European market, as
in Scenario 1, is likely to cause considerable damage to the Russian
economy. Therefore, especially, Scenario 1 represents an extreme
variant, which only means to establish the maximum economic eﬀect
that could follow from possible natural gas ﬂow disruptions in Europe.
3. Results
3.1. Base scenario with natural gas dependencies
First, the base scenario, with which the natural gas disruption
scenarios need to be compared, is set up. For this scenario we exclude
the discrepancy column present in the IRIOT (Tukker et al., 2013) and
we also exclude all changes in inventories and valuables. Both types of
data do not represent actual economic transactions for which we
assume that economic actors will try to maintain them as much as
possible. The removal of these data results in an IRIOT in which supply
no longer equals demand. In the base scenario, this equilibrium is
restored using the base model, i.e., Eqs. (1)–(3). The speciﬁc functional
form of the objective function can be used in this case, as all negatives
are removed from the data.
To evaluate the resulting change in the IRIOT, the mean absolute
percentage error (MAPE) and the weighted mean absolute percentage
error (WAPE) are used.4 The MAPE is found to be 387% and the WAPE
is equal to only 0.11%, which indicates that the large percentage
changes predominantly occur in the smallest cells of the IRIOT. The
size of the world economy, as measured by world GDP, which relates to
the largest cells, was equal to 34,009 billion Euros in the original
IRIOT, whereas in the base scenario IRIOT the total is 34,002 billion
euros (99.98% of the original total). Hence, we conclude that the base
scenario IRIOT is suﬃciently close to the original IRIOT to serve as the
starting point for the scenario simulations.
Using the outcomes of the base scenario IRIOT, new coeﬃcient
matrices for aij s• and cjs are calculated, which are used for the disruption
scenarios. Also, all values with ex in Eq. (1) are replaced with the
corresponding values of bm, where bm indicates the base scenario
Fig. 1. Grouping of EU countries into regions.
Table 2
Natural gas production capacity constraints.






Rest of the World 100%
Table 3
Natural gas disruption scenarios.
Scenario Region imposing export
ban:
On its natural gas exports to:
1 Russian Federation All four EU regions
2 Russian Federation – North-East Europe
3 Russian Federation – East Europe
4 Russian Federation – South-West Europe and North-West
Europe
3 Note that our percentage for North-West Europe is conservative compared to Richter
and Holz (2015), who assume a 15% slack production capacity for Norway and the
Netherlands each. According to BP's Statistical Review of World Energy June 2016, both
Poland and Romania have a reserve of 0.1 trillion cubic metres natural gas at the end of
2015. The reserve-to-production (R/P) ratio is 23.1 years for Poland and 10.7 years for
Romania. Hence, we assume that in the short to medium run a production increase by












, where exi represents
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values. In addition, the initial market equilibrium, from which the
optimization procedure starts, is updated to the outcome of the base
scenario. For each scenario this procedural starting IRIOT is adjusted
such that the cells directly aﬀected by the scenario according to Eq. (5)
are already set equal to zero, in order to speed up the convergence of
the non-linear programming algorithm.
To better interpret the results of the disruption scenarios, Table 4
summarizes the role of the Russian natural gas in the base scenario.
The ﬁrst two columns show the importance of the various buyers from
a Russian perspective. They show that, especially, South-West Europe
and East Europe are important buyers of the Russian gas, while most
natural gas ﬂows to the secondary sector and the electricity from gas
sector. The last two columns of the table show the importance of the
Russian gas supplies from the perspective of the buying sectors and
regions. It shows that North-West Europe is hardly dependent on
imports of Russian gas, due to its availability of large quantities of local
natural gas, whereas East Europe is very dependent on Russian natural
gas. This is also conﬁrmed by the gas disruption literature, which
invariably ﬁnds that East Europe is most vulnerable (e.g. Lochner,
2011, Richter and Holz, 2015).
3.2. Trade adjustments in the four scenarios
Given the Leontief technology restriction (2), substitution between
products of diﬀerent sectors is ruled out. However, local products may
be substituted for products of the same sector from a diﬀerent country.
We therefore, ﬁrst, focus on the shift in trade shares in each gas export
ban scenario.
3.2.1. Import patterns for each of the regions under all scenarios
To assess the impact on trade patterns, we study the import and
self-suﬃciency shares (in short: import shares) for each region-sector
combination for the base model and for each scenario. These shares are
deﬁned relative to the total use of the product at hand as shown in Eq.
(6). This allows us to focus on the geographical origin of the inputs
from the natural gas sector.
∑ ∑t z z tf f f= / , = /ijrs ijrs r ijrs i rs i rs r i rs (6)
Table 5 shows these intermediate demand and ﬁnal demand import
shares under the various scenarios. The supply of natural gas from
North-East Europe is not shown, as it equals zero in all cases.
For North-West (NW) Europe and South-West (SW) Europe,
respectively, Table 5-A and Table 5-B show that the trade patterns
for these regions do not change much, even if they are fully cut oﬀ from
Russian gas. In Table 5-B, we see that SW Europe relies most on NW
Europe and Rest of the World for its intermediate gas supplies. The
ﬁnal demand import shares react notably diﬀerent from the inter-
Table 4
Russia’s natural gas sector’s role as supplier.
Region Sector Sales of Russian gas to a specific
region-sector in million €
Sales to a region-sector as % of
total output of the Russian gasa
Russian sales as % of total gas
inputs per region-sector
Russian sales as % of total gas
imports per region-sector
North-West Primary 0.1 0% 0% 8%
Europe Natural gas
extract.
0.1 0% 0% 2%
Other energy extr. 0.2 0% 0% 1%
Secondary 1.4 0% 0% 2%
Electricity from
gas
0.3 0% 0% 2%
Tertiary 0.2 0% 0% 1%
Final demand 0.4 0% 0% 2%
South-West Primary 1.8 0% 4% 4%
Europe Natural gas
extract.
0.4 0% 2% 5%
Other energy extr. 0.9 0% 2% 5%
Secondary 277.7 6% 4% 4%
Electricity from
gas
477.7 11% 7% 8%
Tertiary 21.1 0% 2% 4%
Final demand 73.2 2% 2% 4%
East Primary 2.1 0% 35% 41%
Europe Natural gas
extract.
10.4 0% 18% 92%
Other energy extr. 2.8 0% 12% 67%
Secondary 514.9 12% 31% 41%
Electricity from
gas
411.3 9% 35% 50%
Tertiary 278.4 6% 73% 87%
Final demand 5.4 0% 12% 21%
North-East Primary 0.5 0% 11% 11%
Europe Natural gas
extract.
0.0 0% 18% 20%
Other energy extr. 0.0 0% 19% 19%
Secondary 44.5 1% 18% 18%
Electricity from
gas
79.7 2% 81% 81%
Tertiary 1.0 0% 6% 6%
Final demand 4.1 0% 13% 13%
Source: Authors' calculations; base model solution, which is very close to the original data from the EXIOPOL database.
a In total 48% of Russian natural gas ﬂows to EU regions.
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mediate demand import shares; most natural gas is sourced close to
home, in NW and SW Europe itself. Scenario 4 shows that, if possible
given the production restrictions of Eq. (4), preference is given to NW
European gas over additional own production and supplies from the
Rest of the World. The share imported from NW Europe is higher in
Scenario 4, than in Scenario 1, where also East Europe and NE Europe
demand additional gas from NW Europe.
For East Europe, Table 5-C shows that the reliance on Rest of the
World increases relatively most, followed by SW Europe and only then
NW Europe. Still, instead of Russia, NW Europe is the largest supplier
for the scenarios under which East Europe is directly aﬀected. For the
scenarios where the region is not directly aﬀected, the supply share of
NW Europe actually decreases somewhat.
North-East Europe in Table 5-D is a special case. Four of the ﬁve
countries of this region (the Baltic States and Finland) are almost fully
dependent on Russia for their gas supplies,5 whereas Sweden fully
relies on gas supplies from NW Europe. Since the natural gas demand
in Sweden is relatively high compared to the other four countries, the
intermediate and ﬁnal demand import shares as regards NW Europe
are relatively high for this heterogeneous region. The possibility of
additional supply from NW Europe will, in the current situation,
therefore will actually be lower than shown in Table 5-D.
For the last three scenarios, in the Tables 5-B to 5-D, we see that if a
region is not directly aﬀected by the export ban, it will actually import a
somewhat larger share of natural gas from Russia, as Russia will look
for alternative buyers. Although we abstract from the actual infra-
structure capacities, our model thus simulates reality in that it does not
allow for an extreme switch to Russian gas because of the assumption
that, under each disruption, all economic actors will attempt to
maintain as closely as possible their business-as-usual ﬂows.
3.2.2. Change in the supply of natural gas sectors in the diﬀerent
regions
Table 5 considered the spatial origin of the trade in natural gas in
the diﬀerent scenarios. Table 6, instead, focusses on the change in
supply of natural gas and its spatial destinations. This table reports
these changes as a percentage of the base scenarios total supply of
natural gas by producing country.
In Scenario 1, the fall in supply from Russia is clearly largest for SW
Europe (–19.31%) and East Europe (–27.75%). Russia itself absorbs
some of this fall in exports domestically, as does the Rest of the World
to a greater extend (+6.34%). However, the total output of the Russian
natural gas extraction sector still falls with as much as −41.42%, which
will deﬁnitely hurt the Russian economy as will be shown in Table 8.
Europe is a very important market for Russia and this high dependence
explains Russia's relentless activities to open up alternative markets.
The most notable increase in supply (+11.52%) is the additional
percentage that East Europe supplies to itself for both scenarios that
aﬀect the region directly. With this increase, East Europe is the only
region that hits the maximum production capacity that we deﬁned
exogenously in Table 2. In contrast, in the two scenarios where East
Europe is not directly hit, the supply of its own natural gas sector falls,
as Russia will then sell more to East Europe.
Also remarkable are the changes in the supply of NW Europe, not
because they are large, but because they are small. This is the more
remarkable because we know from Table 5 that all regions import more
from NW Europe when they are aﬀected, especially East Europe and
Table 5
Intermediate and final demand import shares of natural gas for each affected region.a
5-A Intermediate demand import shares Final demand import shares
North-West Europe B. Sc. Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4 B. Sc. Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4
North-West Europe 99.4 99.4 99.4 99.4 99.4 99.2 99.1 99.2 99.1 99.2
South-West Europe 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
East Europe 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Russia 0.0 – 0.0 0.0 – 0.0 – 0.0 0.0 –
Rest of the World 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5
5-B Intermediate demand import shares Final demand import shares
South-West Europe B. Sc. Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4 B. Sc. Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4
North-West Europe 44.0 45.1 43.8 42.9 46.0 57.4 58.0 57.3 57.0 58.2
South-West Europe 13.2 14.1 13.3 13.2 13.8 39.2 40.9 39.2 38.9 40.6
East Europe 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Russia 5.1 – 5.2 6.4 – 2.4 – 2.5 3.1 –
Rest of the World 37.7 40.8 37.7 37.5 40.2 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1
5-C Intermediate demand import shares Final demand import shares
East Europe B. Sc. Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4 B. Sc. Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4
North-West Europe 22.6 39.8 22.4 39.8 21.5 12.2 16.5 12.1 17.4 11.8
South-West Europe 5.7 10.6 5.7 10.7 5.3 10.9 16.2 10.9 15.4 10.5
East Europe 27.3 31.7 27.1 31.7 26.1 41.0 32.2 41.1 32.7 41.2
Russia 36.6 – 37.0 – 39.9 12.1 – 12.4 – 13.4
Rest of the World 7.9 17.9 7.8 17.7 7.2 23.8 35.0 23.6 34.4 23.2
5-D Intermediate demand import shares Final demand import shares
North-East Europe B. Sc. Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4 B. Sc. Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4
North-West Europe 54.0 81.6 82.0 50.8 51.8 71.4 80.4 81.7 68.7 69.4
South-West Europe 1.6 2.1 2.0 1.5 1.5 7.9 9.6 9.0 7.7 7.8
East Europe 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
Russia 34.7 – – 38.3 37.5 12.6 – – 15.8 14.9
Rest of the World 9.7 16.2 15.9 9.4 9.1 7.9 9.8 9.0 7.7 7.7
a In scenarios that are bold-faced, the region is directly impacted (zero imports from Russia). This results in deﬁnitional zeros that are indicated with a -.
5 This was the case for the base year input-output data. Nowadays, Norway's Statoil
supplies some 60% of Lithuania's natural gas imports. Parts of these imports also ﬁnd
their way to Latvia and Estonia. Using more recent data, therefore, will result is
somewhat diﬀerent outcomes.
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North-East Europe. The explanation is that the domestic use of natural
gas in North-West Europe is large compared to the demand from the
other regions, which makes the percentage point changes in its exports
small.
Comparing the sum of the diﬀerent scenarios in which a subset of
the regions is aﬀected (Scenarios 2–4) with Scenario 1, the sum of the
‘individual’ scenarios generally turns out to be smaller than the changes
in supply in Scenario 1. When the shock is smaller, there is obviously
more ﬂexibility in ﬁnding substitute sources of supply then when all
regions are hit simultaneously.
3.2.3. Impacts on the trade balances
The previous sections investigated the changes in trade shares for
the natural gas sector only. To place these changes in perspective, the
changes in the trade balance for each region, in constant base scenario
prices, are presented here. The balance for each region is calculated as
follows.
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑b z y z y= + − −s r s i j ijsr r s i isr r s i j ijrs r s i irs≠ , , ≠ , . ≠ , , ≠ , . (7)
In Table 7, the ﬁrst column shows the balance for each region in the
base scenario, in absolute values. The total of this column equals zero,
because total exports equal total imports at the world level. For Russia,
the export ban to all of Europe (Scenario 1) has a relatively large
negative impact on the value of its trade balance, which is now less
positive than in the base scenario. The trade surplus of NW Europe and
SW Europe increases in all scenarios. Most remarkable, however, is the
relatively small size of the impacts on the trade balances of all
scenarios. This raises the question whether the impact on welfare
indicators such as GDP and total ﬁnal demand will be comparably
small.
3.3. Impact on value added
The changes in trade patterns in Tables 5 and 6 inﬂuence value
added generated in each region-sector. Table 8 shows the change in
value added, in constant base scenario prices, for the three smaller
sectors for each region separately. The three large sectors (primary,
secondary and tertiary) are only represented indirectly by the total
change of GDP, because the changes in terms of inputs from the natural
gas sectors, and other shifts in the input structure, are relatively small
compared to the overall size of these sectors.
Alike the changes in trade shares, we see again that the overall
change in value added for Scenario 1 is larger than the sum of the
changes in the three sub-scenarios. Clearly, in the case of a complete
Russian gas export ban to the entire EU, fallback systems, where other
regions step in for the loss of Russian supply, are also hit, including the
feedback loops between these systems, resulting in a larger overall
impact than with the sum of the partial export bans.
At the level of the three small sectors, the behavior of the gas
extraction sector, on the one hand, and the other energy extraction and
the electricity from gas sectors, on the other hand, is opposite in almost
all cases. The equal signs of the changes for both the other energy
extraction sector and the electricity sector indicate that the theoretical
Table 6
Change in sales of the natural gas sector by region of origin, as a percentage of total output.
Regions of destination of natural gas sales
NW SW East NEa Russia RoW Total change
Scenario 1: all EU
NW Europe −0.55 0.10 1.46 0.25 0.00 −0.10 1.16
SW Europe 0.08 2.08 3.74 0.04 0.00 −0.56 5.38
East Europe −0.05 −0.21 11.52 −0.01 −0.02 −1.23 10.00
Russia −0.06 −19.31 −27.75 −2.94 2.31 6.34 −41.42
Rest World 0.00 0.31 0.21 0.01 −0.11 −0.30 0.12
Scenario 2: NE Europe
NW Europe −0.05 −0.12 −0.02 0.25 0.00 −0.01 0.06
SW Europe 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.07
East Europe 0.00 0.00 −0.52 0.01 0.00 0.01 −0.49
Russia 0.00 0.50 0.36 −2.94 0.13 0.24 −1.70
Rest World 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0.00
Scenario 3: East Europe
NW Europe −0.33 −0.66 1.45 −0.03 0.00 −0.02 0.41
SW Europe 0.02 −1.48 3.78 −0.01 0.00 0.07 2.39
East Europe −0.04 −0.20 11.52 −0.02 −0.02 −1.24 10.00
Russia 0.02 4.90 −27.75 0.32 1.00 2.56 −18.94
Rest World 0.00 −0.02 0.21 0.00 −0.05 −0.11 0.03
Scenario 4: SW+NW
NW Europe −0.22 0.63 −0.09 −0.02 0.00 −0.02 0.28
SW Europe 0.00 1.77 −0.29 0.00 0.00 0.18 1.66
East Europe 0.01 0.03 −3.56 0.00 0.00 0.17 −3.35
Russia −0.06 −19.31 2.64 0.25 0.71 1.80 −13.98
Rest World 0.00 0.25 −0.01 0.00 −0.04 −0.13 0.06
Note: the changes that are bold-faced represent the values that are set to zero. In all cases where the 2-digit value is equal to 0.00, a minus sign is included if the (small) change is
negative.
a North-East Europe is not included as a row in the diﬀerent scenarios due to the non-existing gas extraction.
Table 7
Balance of payments, percentage change compared to base scenario.
B. Sc. (M €) Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4
North-West Europe 74,110 0.74% 0.05% 0.32% 0.22%
South-West Europe 27,469 1.65% 0.05% 0.69% 0.84%
East Europe −32,866 −0.41% 0.03% −0.49% 0.17%
North -East Europe 26,185 −0.03% 0.06% −0.06% −0.05%
Russia 45,194 −3.12% −0.13% −1.41% −1.05%
Rest of the World −140,092 −0.20% 0.00% −0.05% −0.11%
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possibility of indirect technical substitution does occur in our model
simulations. The aggregate character of the other three sectors,
obviously, prevents this indirect substitution to dominate the direct
technical complementary assumed in Eq. (2).
The opposite sign of the changes in the electricity from gas sector
and the gas extraction sector requires a longer explanation. The
increases in local gas extraction in the EU regions, in fact, occur to
compensate for the drop in Russian imports, but this compensation
appears to be partial, and, therefore, it is combined with an opposite
change in the use of gas by the electricity from gas sector. The case of
East Europe is especially interesting in both cases where it is not itself
subject to a Russian export ban, i.e., in the Scenario´s 2 and 4. In those
cases, Russia will increase its exports to East Europe, its largest
customer in the EU, in order to compensate for its losses in the rest
of the EU. Consequently, we see an increase in the output of the
electricity from gas sector in East Europe combined with a decrease in
its home extraction of natural gas.
Furthermore, in all scenarios, we see that the change in the local
natural gas extraction sector determines the sign of the change in total
volume of GDP for almost all regions. Higher order spatial substitution
processes mitigate the direct impact on the natural gas extraction
sector, but do not change the sign of its impact on total value added.
The exception is North-East Europe that does not have a natural gas
extraction sector. In that case, we see that the change in the secondarily
impacted sector, i.e., the electricity from gas sector, determines the sign
of the total GDP impact.
As to the size of the total GDP impact, the only region that really
suﬀers from the export bans is Russia itself, but even that impact is
almost negligible at the level of the macro economy, i.e., – 0.5% in case
of the maximum supply shock of Scenario 1.6 NW and SW Europe
proﬁt from all four types of export bans, but their gains are both
absolutely and percentagewise much smaller than the already small
losses for Russia.
3.4. Impact on total domestic consumption
As a second measure of welfare, next to value added, and in fact
even more relevant for domestic welfare, we also look at the impact of
the four scenario´s on domestic ﬁnal demand, in constant base
scenario prices.
The changes in the underlying ﬁnal demand import and self-
suﬃciency shares of the directly impacted gas extraction sector were
shown in Table 5. The associated impact on the volume of the ﬁnal
consumption of natural gas, irrespective of its geographic origin, is
shown in Table 9. Again note that the impact of the sum of the
Scenario´s 2–4 is smaller than the impact of the combined Scenario 1.
Furthermore, it is obvious that the domestic consumption of the more
abundant natural gas in Russia will increase in all scenarios, whereas
the natural gas consumption of the European regions decreases in
almost all cases.
Interesting are the two plusses. Take the +2.6% of the consumption
of natural gas in East Europe in case of a supply shock in SW and NW
Europe (Scenario 4). East Europe being near, obviously, serves as a
substitute market for Russian gas in that case. The same holds for the
+0.2% increase in North-East Europe, in case of a supply shock in East
Europe (Scenario 3). The most puzzling outcome of Table 10 seems to
be the decrease in the consumption of natural gas in the RoW.
However, this can also be explained easily. The strong increase in the
exports of natural gas from the RoW to the boycotted regions of
Europe, induced by the higher prices there, partly goes at the cost of
their local consumers.
Finally, consider Table 10 that shows the impacts of the four
scenarios on the welfare of the population of the regions involved.
Remarkably, in contrast with the negative impact on GDP, the Russian
population will beneﬁt from the Russian refusal to export its natural
gas to parts or the whole of the EU. Part of the reason for this outcome
is the increase of the domestic consumption of natural gas shown in
Table 9. Note that this increase may postpone the necessary reduction
of the ineﬃciencies in the Russian domestic use of energy (see
Proskuryakova and Filippov, 2015). These ineﬃciencies are partly
explained by the low prices of energy, which will be further lowered
in each of the four scenarios. These longer term negative externality
impacts on Russian welfare are not considered in our simulations, as
they run aside of the market transactions in Eq. (2). The other part of
the reason for the domestic welfare increase is summarized in Table 7,
which shows a decrease of Russia´s trade balance surplus, which
enables Russian consumers to consume more of the negatively
Table 8
Percentage change in value added in the gas-related sectors and the total economy.
NW SW E NE Russia RoW
Scenario 1: all EU
Natural gas extraction 1.16 5.38 10.00 – −41.42 0.12
Other energy extraction −0.02 −0.01 −0.07 −0.07 0.01 −0.00
Electricity from gas −0.28 −0.47 −7.50 −8.48 1.74 −0.05
Total value added 0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.50 0.00
Total absolute changea 320 150 18 −9 −1280 105
Scenario 2: NE
Natural gas extraction 0.06 0.07 −0.49 – −1.70 0.00
Other energy extraction −0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.16 0.00 −0.00
Electricity from gas 0.01 −0.00 0.19 −8.18 0.25 −0.00
Total value added 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.02 0.00
Total absolute changea 16 2 −2 −7 −52 1
Scenario 3: E
Natural gas extraction 0.41 2.39 10.00 – −18.94 0.03
Other energy extraction −0.01 0.00 −0.06 0.04 0.01 −0.00
Electricity from gas −0.13 0.09 −7.98 0.52 0.46 −0.01
Total value added 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.23 0.00
Total absolute changea 113 80 20 0 −588 28
Scenario 4: SW+NW
Natural gas extraction 0.28 1.66 −3.35 – −13.98 0.06
Other energy extraction −0.01 −0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 −0.00
Electricity from gas −0.09 −0.35 1.25 0.38 0.26 −0.03
Total value added 0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.17 0.00
Total absolute changea 77 37 −14 0 −435 47
a In absolute M€ compared to base model.
Table 9
Change in the final consumption of natural gas, in percentages.
B. Sc. (abs. M€) Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4
North-West Europe 2533 −8.2 −0.8 −4.7 −3.4
South-West Europe 3075 −7.7 −0.6 −4.0 −4.8
East Europe 44 −32.5 −0.1 −32.2 2.6
North-East Europe 32 −16.7 −13.1 0.2 −1.0
Russian Federation 21 46.2 1.2 15.3 9.3
Rest of the World 26,674 −0.9 0.0 −0.2 −0.4
Table 10
Change in total final consumption, in percentages.
b.sc abs 1000 M€ Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4
North-West Europe 2166 −0.011 −0.001 −0.006 −0.004
South-West Europe 5524 −0.005 0.000 −0.002 −0.004
East Europe 717 −0.016 0.001 −0.020 0.006
North-East Europe 355 0.000 −0.006 0.005 0.004
Russian Federation 212 0.062 0.002 0.024 0.018
Rest of the World 25,027 −0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
6 For reference: in the base year input-output data the share of value added of Russian
natural gas extraction in total Russian value added (GDP) was 1.21%.
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impacted domestic value added. Whether this decrease in the balance
of payments is sustainable in the longer run may be doubtful, but in the
short to medium run, which is the focus of our model, this impact is
quite likely.
The reverse impact may be observed for most European regions
with most scenario´s. There, increases in total value added, concen-
trated in the local gas extraction sector, go together with decrease of
total domestic consumption. Again, part of the reason is found in the
lower consumption of natural gas shown in Table 9, induced by the
higher gas prices, and another part of the reason is found in the more
positive trade balances in Table 7.
4. Conclusion and policy implications
In this paper we have analyzed several scenarios related to
reductions or obstructions in the supply of natural gas across country
borders. The pattern of impacts found with our new modelling
approach reﬂects the partially compensating and partially enhancing
simultaneous forces of supply and demand and spatial substitution
eﬀects. At the lower levels of aggregation, for example, as regards the
import and self-suﬃciency shares for the use of natural gas, consider-
able eﬀects are found. At the aggregate level of the whole economy,
however, the eﬀects of Russian natural gas export bans are negligible
for Europe and only a little less so for Russia itself. Interestingly, the
eﬀects on the size of the economy, as measured by its GDP, are
predominantly positive for the European regions, but negative for
Russia. The eﬀects on the welfare of the populations involved, however,
as measured by the size of the domestic ﬁnal demand, have an opposite
sign; with predominantly negligible but negative eﬀects for the
European regions, and very small, but positive eﬀects for the Russian
population.
In view of this empirical conclusion, the question arises whether the
outcome of negligible impacts of various Russian export stops is not
overly optimistic and due to the aggregate character of the present
simulations. First, consider the sectoral aggregation used in this
application. Having a further disaggregation of sectors that use natural
gas intensively might show vulnerabilities that now remain undetected.
On the other hand, however, separating the electricity production
based on other energy carriers from the secondary sector and allowing
for technical substitution between the diﬀerent types of electricity will
introduce more ﬂexibility, and thus mitigate the presently predicted
negative forward eﬀects from electricity on the secondary sector.
Second, consider the spatial aggregation used in this application.
Having a further disaggregation between the diﬀerent EU member
states will allow modelling the fragmentation of the EU natural gas
market by introducing bilateral trade capacity constraints, which reﬂect
the actual natural gas pipeline capacities. The model then would not
depict the presently assumed full ﬂexibility of the interregional EU
natural gas trade, which will most certainly lead to several eastern EU-
countries being hurt more and maybe some northwestern EU-countries
being hurt less than is shown in the present simulation outcomes. In
any case, this new modelling approach appears to be promising and, for
the moment, conﬁrms the EU expectation that it could cope well with
the consequences of a Russian gas boycott.
Finally, note that the scenarios presented in this paper are rather
generic. For more speciﬁc analyses, and in order to take into account
pipeline infrastructure capacities, our model could relatively easily be
combined with a more detailed model for the natural gas sector. The
results of this more detailed model, in terms of the optimal gas
production levels and gas ﬂows, could be introduced as constraints in
the present model. This would make it possible to compute the wider
economic impacts of the optimal solution that results from the sector
model.
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Code Aggregate sector Aggregate sector # of subsectors
i01.a – i05 Primary sector Primary sector 27
i10 Other energy extraction Natural gas extraction 1
i11.a Other energy extraction Other energy extraction 4
i11.b Natural gas extraction Secondary sector 62
i11.c Other energy extraction Electricity from gas 1
i12 Other energy extraction Tertiary sector 34
i13.1 – i14.3 Primary sector
i15.a – i40.11.a Secondary sector
i40.11.b Electricity from gas
i40.11.c – i45 Secondary sector
i50.a – i99 Tertiary sector
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